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ABSTRACT
Several protocols have been proposed to defend against worm-
holes in ad hoc networks by adopting positioning devices,
synchronized clocks, or directional antennas. In this paper,
we propose a mechanism, MDS-VOW, to detect wormholes
in a sensor network. MDS-VOW rst reconstructs the lay-
out of the sensors using multi-dimensional scaling. To com-
pensate the distortions caused by distance measurement er-
rors, a surface smoothing scheme is adopted. MDS-VOW
then detects the wormhole by visualizing the anomalies in-
troduced by the attack. The anomalies, which are caused by
the fake connections through the wormhole, bend the recon-
structed surface to pull the sensors that are faraway to each
other. Through detecting the bending feature, the worm-
hole is located and the fake connections are identied. The
contributions of MDS-VOW are: (1) it does not require the
sensors to be equipped with special hardware, (2) it adopts
and combines the techniques from social science, computer
graphics, and scientic visualization to attack the problem
in network security. We examine the accuracy of the pro-
posed mechanism when the sensors are deployed in a circle
area and one wormhole exists in the network. The results
show that MDS-VOW has a low false alarm ratio when the
distance measurement errors are not large.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Systems Organization]: Computer-
Communication Networks { Security and protection; I.2.9
[Computing Methodologies]: Robotics { Sensors
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Visualization, Sensor Networks, Wormhole Attacks, Multi-
Dimensional Scaling
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1. INTRODUCTION
As sensor networks are merging into the pervasive com-
puting environment, security becomes a central requirement.
In this paper, we focus on the detection of wormhole attacks
in sensor networks. Since the sensors use a radio channel
to send information, the malicious nodes can eavesdrop the
packets, tunnel them to another location in the network,
and retransmit them. This generates a false scenario that
the original sender is in the neighborhood of the remote lo-
cation. The tunneling procedure forms a wormhole. If a
fast transmission path (e.g. a dedicated channel shared by
attackers) exists between the two ends of the wormhole, the
tunneled packets can propagate faster than those through
a normal multi-hop route. This forms the \rushing attack"
studied by Hu et al [14].
Wormhole attacks put severe threats to both routing pro-
tocols and some security enhancements in sensor networks.
For example, the sensors may depend on the neighbor dis-
covery procedures to construct the local network topology. If
the neighbor discovery beacons are tunneled through worm-
holes, the good nodes will get false information about their
neighbors. This may lead to the choice of a non-existent
route. The impacts of a wormhole on the route discovery
procedure in a sensor network have been studied in [12].
Similar condition will happen if distributed monitoring is
applied to detect network misbehaviours. The wormhole
can selectively tunnel the normal packets sent by the secu-
rity violator to the remote side, but not the packets that will
expose the violator. Therefore, the real neighbors of the vi-
olator and the sensors at the remote side will get opposite
conclusions on the node.
Research eorts have been put on wormhole detection in
ad hoc networks and encouraging results have been collected
[13, 4, 12]. These methods usually require the mobile nodes
to be equipped with some special hardware, such as posi-
tioning devices, synchronized clocks, or directional antennas.
With the progresses in integrated circuit design and hard-
ware manufacture, these devices will become cheap, small,
and power ecient enough to t in sensors in the future.
In this paper, we present a more hardware-ecient ap-
proach to defend against wormholes in sensor networks. The
mechanism, MDS-VOW (Multi-Dimensional Scaling - Visu-
alization Of Wormhole), does not require the sensors to be
equipped with special hardware. It reconstructs the network
using multi-dimensional scaling and detects the wormhole
by visualizing the anomalies introduced by the attack. Be-
fore presenting the details of the mechanism, we use three
examples to illustrate the impacts of the wormhole on the
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Figure 1. Reconstruct network using MDS.
The sensors are deployed on the grids in a circle area. A part of
the neighbor relations are shown as the lines to assist the under-
standing of the gures. We assume that the distance measure-
ments between neighbors are accurate when they are provided to
MDS. (a) The original sensor network. (b) The rebuilt network
when no wormhole exists. (c) The rebuilt network when a worm-
hole exists between sensor A and C. (d) The rebuilt network
when a wormhole exists between sensor B and C.
reconstructed network in Figure 1. Figure 1.(a) shows the
original sensor network and the sensors are deployed on the
grids in a circle area. Figure 1.(b) shows the reconstructed
network using MDS when no wormhole exists and its lay-
out is almost the same as the original network. In Figure
1.(c) and (d), the wormhole will pull the sensors at the two
ends to each other through the fake connection, and results
in a bent surface. Through detecting the bending feature,
MDS-VOW will identify the fake connections and locate the
wormhole.
MDS-VOW mechanism consists of four steps: (1) It uses
the inaccurate distance measurements between the sensors
that can \hear" each other (might through a wormhole) as
inputs to estimate the distance between every sensor pair.
(2) Using multi-dimensional scaling, we reconstruct the net-
work of sensors and calculate a virtual position for each
of them. (3) A surface smoothing mechanism is adopted
to compensate the impacts of distance estimation errors on
the reconstructed network. The mechanism will preserve
the features that are introduced by the wormhole. (4) The
shape of the reconstructed network is analyzed and the fake
neighbor connections will be identied.
As we will demonstrate, this simple method can eectively
identify the fake neighbor connections. Moreover, it only re-
quires the inaccurate distance estimations between the sen-
sors. The reconstructed network is an arbitrary rotation
and translation of the original network. Since the detection
method focuses on the shape of the network instead of the
coordinates of the sensors, we do not require the deployment
of \anchors" that are equipped with positioning devices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
section 2, we review the previous work on the application of
MDS in wireless networks, wormhole detection, and distance
estimation between wireless nodes. Section 3 describes the
building blocks of MDS-VOW and the algorithm in detail.
The problems such as system bootstrapping, distance error
compensation, and wormhole detection are studied. Section
4 presents the experimental results acquired through simula-
tion. Two scenarios, grid placement and random placement
of the sensors, are studied by varying the distance estimation
error rate. Section 5 discusses the impacts of sensor density,
the safety of MDS-VOW, and the future work. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
MDS and Its Applications in Wireless Networks
Multi-dimensional scaling was originally a technique de-
veloped in the behavioral and social science for studying the
structure of objects. The inputs to MDS are the measures
of the dierence or similarity between object pairs [7]. The
output of MDS is a layout of the objects in a low-dimensional
space. In this paper, the input is the distance matrix be-
tween the sensors. The mechanism can reconstruct the net-
work and calculate a virtual position for each sensor. We
adopt the classical metric MDS in the proposed mechanism,
in which the distances are treated as in a Euclidean space.
More details of MDS can be found in [7, 27].
MDS has been applied to solve the localization and po-
sitioning problems in wireless networks. In [26], a solution
using classical metric MDS is proposed to achieve localiza-
tion from mere connectivity information. The algorithm is
more robust to measurement errors and requires fewer an-
chors than previous approaches. A distributed mechanism
for sensor positioning using MDS has been presented in [15].
It develops a multi-variate optimization-based iterative al-
gorithm to calculate the positions of the sensors. Another
approach [2] for sensor network localization applies semi-
denite programming relaxation to minimize the errors for
tting the distance measurements.
Wormhole Detection
Wormhole attacks on mobile ad hoc networks were inde-
pendently discovered by Dahill et al [6], Hass et al [20], and
Hu et al [13]. To defend against them, some eorts have been
put on the signal processing techniques. If the data bits are
transferred in some special modulating method known only
to the neighbor nodes, they are resistant to the wormholes.
Another approach, RF watermarking, works in the similar
way. Both mechanisms prevent wormholes by increasing the
diculties to capture the signal patterns.
The adoption of directional antennas [16, 5] by mobile
nodes can improve security. A solution that uses such equip-
ments to defend against wormholes has been presented in
[12]. The neighbor nodes examine the directions of the re-
ceived signals from each other and a shared witness. Only
when the directions of both pairs match, the neighbor rela-
tion is conrmed.
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mobile node in an indoor environment [22, 1, 28] can be ap-
plied to prevent wormholes. For example, both the original
packet and the resent one will be captured by the location
sensors and two conicting positions of the same node will
be detected. Either the good nodes or a centralized con-
troller will discover this anomalous result. However, it will
not be easy to port such methods to outdoor environments.
One approach to detect wormholes without clock synchro-
nization is proposed by Capkun et al [4]. Every node is
assumed to be equipped with a special hardware that can
respond to a one-bit challenge without any delay. The chal-
lenger measures the round trip time of the signal with an
accurate clock to calculate the distance between the nodes.
The probability that an attacker can guess all bits cor-
rectly decreases exponentially as the number of challenges
increases.
Packet leash is a solution proposed by Hu, Perrig and
Johnson for wormhole prevention [13]. The leash is the in-
formation added into a packet to restrict its transmission
distance. In the geographical leashes, the location infor-
mation and loosely synchronized clocks together verify the
neighbor relation. In the temporal leashes, the packet trans-
mission distance is calculated as the product of signal prop-
agation time and the speed of light.
Distance Estimation between Wireless Nodes
Several schemes have been proposed to estimate the dis-
tance between the wireless nodes. The example solutions
include received signal strength [17], Time-of-Arrival and
Time Dierence of Arrival [21, 25, 4], and triangulation [24,
19]. Among them, Received Signal Strength Indicator is the
most cost-ecient method because it does not require any
extra hardware on the node. One disadvantage, however, is
that the measured distance can be inaccurate. For example,
an estimation error from 5% to 40% of the radio range has
been assumed in [23]. The estimation accuracy can be im-
proved by establishing a more accurate signal propagation
model or using the stability of the strength dierence at
various points. In MDS-VOW, we adopt a mechanism from
computer graphics to smooth the reconstructed network and
compensate the impacts of the measurement errors.
3. VISUALIZATION OF WORMHOLES IN
SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 System Assumptions
We assume that the links among sensors are bidirectional
and two neighbor sensors can always send packets to each
other. This assumption will hold under most conditions
when the power of the sensor has not been exhausted. We
assume that two sensors are neighbors when the distance
between them is shorter than r, where r is dened as the
radio range.
To use MDS to reconstruct the network layout, we assume
that the sensors and their neighbor relations construct a
connected graph, i.e. a path exists between every sensor
pair. The density of sensors may also impact the network
reconstruction, and we give more discussion on this problem
in section 5.
We assume that a special node exists in the sensor net-
work, which is called the \controller". The controller can ac-
complish the O(n
3) operations required by the MDS mech-
anism in a short period of time when there are n sensors in
the network. In our experiments, we use a PC with 1.8G
CPU and 512M RAM as the controller. When n  400, it
takes the machine a few seconds to reconstruct the network.
When the controller broadcasts a message with full power,
all sensors in the network can receive the data. On the
contrary, only the sensors within the radio range to the con-
troller can directly communicate to it. Others need to send
their packets through the multi-hop routes. The adoption
of the centralized controller impacts the scalability of MDS-
VOW. Extending the mechanism to a distributed approach
is discussed in the future work.
We assume that the sensors are not self-movable. There-
fore, once deployed, the route changes are mainly caused by
the \dead" or broken of the sensors. Extending MDS-VOW
to a movable environment is discussed in section 5.
The sensors broadcast the neighbor discovery beacons at
the same power level so that the neighbors can estimate the
distances using the received signal strength. The sensors re-
port the list of nodes that they can hear and the estimated
distances to the controller. We assume that the controller
and the sensors share a group key. This key is only used to
protect the trac generated by MDS-VOW and it is mainly
used during network bootstrap. Therefore, the time dura-
tion and the amount of trac that a malicious node can
acquire to break the key is limited. The key can be deter-
mined before the sensors are deployed [3].
The sensors estimate the distances with the received signal
strength. The accuracy of the estimation is impacted by
various factors, such as the terrain, background noise level,
or even the weather condition. We model the measurement
errors as uniform noises. With an error rate em, if the real
distance between two sensors is d (d  r), a random value
drawn from the uniform distribution [d (1 em), d(1 +
em)] is used as the measured distance. If the chosen value is
smaller than 0 or larger than the radio range, 0 or r will be
used respectively. In our experiments, we examine dierent
values of em from 0 to 0.8.
3.2 Network Bootstrap
As we discussed before, the sensors send the list of nodes
that they can hear and the distance estimations to the con-
troller. The list may include both the real neighbors and the
fake ones through the wormholes. Since the data is trans-
ferred through multi-hop routes and the detection has not
been conducted, these routes could be controlled by worm-
holes and the data could become the target of the attacks. If
the information cannot reach to the controller, the detection
accuracy of MDS-VOW will be impacted. To prevent this
problem, the network bootstrap is conducted as follows.
After sensor deployment, the controller will broadcast a
route discovery packet to the sensors within the radio range
r and mark the path length to itself as 0. The sensors re-
ceiving the packet will increase the path length by one and
re-broadcast it. With every sensor remembers the previous
hop, increases the path length by one, and re-broadcasts the
packet, the routes to the controller will be established. If
multiple packets are received by a sensor, it will use the one
with the shortest path length. These routes can only be used
to send the sensor lists and distance estimations for worm-
hole detection. Once the fake connections are excluded and
the real neighbors are known to every sensor, other routing
protocols can be adopted for sensing data transfer.
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hear and sending the information to the controller, every
sensor will put itself in an \idle" state until a reply from
the controller is received. In this state, a sensor will not
forward packets for other nodes except the sensor lists and
distance estimations. The controller examines the received
packets and broadcasts a list with full power that includes
the sensors whose information has not been received. These
sensors, worrying about that their packets will get lost again,
will ood the network with their information. The controller
has a good chance to get the ooded packets. MDS-VOW
will ignore the sensors whose packets are still not received.
For every sensor pair that can hear each other, the con-
troller calculates the average of the two estimated distances
and uses it in MDS. A connection will be ignored if none of
the estimations or only one of them is received. Then the
controller will execute MDS-VOW to identify the fake con-
nections. It will send a reply with full power to every sensor
and the reply includes the sensor's non-suspicious neighbors.
After receiving the reply, the sensor will switch to the \op-
eration" state and only uses the non-suspicious neighbors
during route discovery and packet forwarding. Those neigh-
bors that can be heard but fail to pass the detection will
not be used. Therefore, a neighbor connection must be ex-
amined by MDS-VOW before it is adopted by the sensors.
The attackers cannot hide the fake connections from the
controller if they want the fake connections to be used.
After the execution of MDS-VOW, other routing proto-
cols can be adopted to establish routes and transfer data as
long as the sensors only use the non-suspicious neighbors.
Since we assume that the sensors are not self-movable, there
should not be any new neighbors appearing during the net-
work operation. Therefore, MDS-VOW does not need to be
run repeatedly when the sensors adapt to the route changes.
The packets transferred for MDS-VOW are protected by
the group key. Message authentication code (MAC) can
be calculated and attached to the packets to protect their
integrity. Some sensors may stay in the \idle" state and
cannot operate properly if they fail to get the replies. With
the high density of sensors, their impacts on sensing coverage
and routing are restricted.
3.3 Building Blocks of MDS-VOW
3.3.1 Network Reconstruction
The proposed mechanism uses the measured distances be-
tween the sensors that can hear each other to reconstruct
the network layout. For every such pair, both sensors will
estimate the distance and send it to the controller. The
controller calculates the average value and puts the result
at the suitable positions in the distance matrix. If the aver-
age value is larger than the radio range, r will be used in the
matrix. The distance from a sensor to itself is 0. After the
distances between the sensor pairs that can hear each other
are calculated, a classical shortest-path algorithm, such as
Dijkstra's algorithm, can be applied to calculate the shortest
distance between every sensor pair. When all positions in
the distance matrix have been lled, MDS can be applied to
rebuild the network and a virtual position for every sensor
will be generated.
3.3.2 Distance Error Compensation
The distance estimation errors have a signicant impact
on network reconstruction. As an example, Figure 2 shows
em = 0.2 em = 0.4
em = 0.6 em = 0.8
Figure 2. Impacts of measurement errors on
network reconstruction.
the results of MDS when the sensors are deployed in a circle
area as in Figure 1.(a). No wormhole exists in the network
and the error rate em increases from 0.2 to 0.8. From the
results, we nd that mechanisms must be designed to com-
pensate the errors while preserving the features that are
introduced by the wormholes.
We propose to apply the smoothing algorithm for the re-
constructed 3D surfaces [9, 11] to accomplish the task. The
mechanism consists of two steps: (1) it calculates a tting
plane for every sensor based on the coordinates of itself and
its neighbors, (2) a new position of the sensor is determined
by the old coordinate and its projection on the tting plane.
The details are discussed as follows.
For a sensor whose position is s, the positions of its k
neighbors are represented as N0 to Nk 1. We rst calculate
the center of these k + 1 nodes as:
c =
s +
P
Nj
k + 1
;j = 0k   1 (1)
The tting plane of s will pass the center. Besides a point
on the plane, we also need to calculate its normalized vector
vs. Using the positions of these k+1 sensors and the center,
we can construct a 3  3 matrix as:
M =
k 1 X
j=0
(Nj   c)(Nj   c)
T + (s   c)(s   c)
T (2)
M is a symmetric, positive semi-denite matrix and it has
been shown in [11] that the unit eigenvector corresponding
to the smallest eigenvalue of M is the normalized vector vs
of the desired plane, and the smallest eigenvalue indicates
the least-squares error. The eigenvalues can be calculated
by the QR factorization [10]. With the calculation of c and
vs, the tting plane T for s is determined.
If two sensors s and s
0 are close to each other and the
local surface is relatively at, the tting planes T and T
0 are
nearly parallel. In other words, the point product of the two
normal vectors has a value close to 1 or -1. On the contrary,
if the surface close to s is very \bumpy", the normal vectors
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Figure 3. Smoothing the reconstructed network.
(a) and (b) show the smoothing operations when the local surface
is at and bumpy. (c) shows the smoothing eects when no worm-
hole exists. (d) shows the eects when a wormhole exists in the
network.
of T and T
0 may vary greatly. After calculating the tting
planes, we generate a value p for every sensor to describe the
smoothness of the nearby surface. For s and its neighbors
N0 to Nk 1, we dene:
ps =
P
jvs  vNjj
k
;j = 0k   1 (3)
Since all vectors are normalized, ps has a value between
0 and 1. The larger the value is, the more smooth the local
surface is. The projection of s on T is represented as sT.
We smooth the reconstructed network by calculating the
new position of s as:
news = ps  s + (1   ps)  sT (4)
Examples of the smoothing procedure are shown in Fig-
ure 3. If the local surface is at, c will also be on the same
plane and ps is close to 1. Therefore, news will almost be
at the same position as s, as shown in Figure 3.(a). On
the contrary, if the local surface uctuates a lot, the normal
vectors of the neighbors will point to all dierent directions.
The new position will be close to sT, as shown in Figure
3.(b). Dierent from the \bumpy" features caused by the
measurement errors, the bending feature of the network is
caused by the fake neighbor connections through the worm-
hole. Its impacted area is much larger than a sensor and
its neighbors. It will not be removed by the smoothing op-
erations that focus on a small area of the network and the
results can be seen in Figure 3.(c) and (d).
3.3.3 Detection of Wormhole
The results in Figure 3 show that if no wormhole exists in
the network, the reconstructed surface after smoothing will
be relatively at. However, if two sensors are linked by a
wormhole, the MDS mechanism will bend the reconstructed
surface to t the fake connection and minimize the tting
errors. If we imagine the network as a pie of soft rubber,
the wormhole can be viewed as a \string" that pulls two
sensors to each other and leads to the distortion of bending.
Detecting the bending feature caused by the wormhole and
locating the ends of the \string" will help us to identify the
fake neighbor connections.
Figure 4 shows a reconstructed surface and the enlarge-
ment of the fake connection and its nearby areas. We nd
that the fake connection through the wormhole and the
neighbor sensors at both ends will form a two-ended torch
structure. This structure can be detected by examining the
angles between the fake connection and the planes deter-
mined by the neighbor sensors. For example, the fake con-
nection in Figure 4 is almost vertical to the plane A1A3A5
and B1B2B3. In MDS-VOW, we rst derive a normalized
torch counter for every connection based on the two-ended
torch structures that it forms. Using the counters of the
connections that a sensor is involved in, we dene a wormhole
indicator for every sensor. MDS-VOW then labels the con-
nections between two sensors with large wormhole indicators
as fake connections. The details are described as follows.
Assume that a sensor s can hear other k sensors as N0
to Nk 1. For every connection sNj (j = 0k   1), we
calculate the number of two-ended torch structures that it
forms. We assume that the neighbors of s can determine g
dierent planes, and the neighbors of Nj can determine h
dierent planes. We choose one plane from each set and
examine the angles between the connection sNj and the
planes. When both angles are 
3
8 , we count it as a
two-ended torch structure. We examine all gh combina-
tions. Since the number of the planes determined by the
neighbors may vary greatly, the counter for sNj is then nor-
malized by dividing gh. We dene this normalized number
as the normalized torch counter of the connection sNj.
When we have calculated the counters for all the connec-
tions sNj (j = 0k 1), we dene the wormhole indicator
of s as maxfcounter of sNj;j = 0k   1g. As the ex-
amples of the proposed mechanism, we demonstrate the
wormhole indicators of the sensors in dierent network sce-
narios in Figure 5.
From Figure 5 we nd that the sensors close to the ends of
the wormhole can be easily identied. MDS-VOW then la-
bels the connections between two sensors that have large
wormhole indicators as fake connections. In our experi-
ments, we set the threshold at 0.6. The advantage of this
method is that the sensors, no matter where their positions
are in the network, can be handled in a uniform way. The
disadvantage, however, is that some real neighbor connec-
tions may be wrongly accused as wormholes and false pos-
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Figure 4. The two-ended torch structure caused by a
wormhole.
itive alarms will be introduced into the system. We study
this problem through experiments in section 4.
3.4 The MDS-VOW Algorithm
With the readiness of all building blocks, we now walk
through the steps of the MDS-VOW algorithm.
1. Every sensor estimates the distances to the nodes that
it can hear and reports them to the controller.
2. The Dijkstra's algorithm is applied to calculate the
distance between every pair of sensors and the distance
matrix of the network is constructed.
3. Using the classical metric MDS method, MDS-VOW
reconstructs the layout of the network and calculates
a virtual position for each sensor.
4. Smoothing mechanism is applied to compensate the
impacts of the measurement errors. The mechanism
will preserve the feature that is introduced by worm-
hole.
5. The wormhole indicator of every sensor in the recon-
structed network is calculated. The fake neighbor con-
nections through wormholes are identied.
6. The fake connections are distributed to the sensors by
the controller. These connections will be avoided dur-
ing routing and packet forwarding.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The performance of MDS-VOW is examined through sim-
ulation. The experiments are conducted in two phases. In
the rst phase, we use ns2 to simulate the distance esti-
mation procedures and the report of the information to the
controller. The packets may get lost because of the unreli-
able medium. In the second phase, a Visual C++ program
executes the MDS-VOW mechanism based on the received
distances and tries to identify the fake neighbor connections.
The sensors are deployed in a circle area instead of a square.
This choice is inspired by the scenario that a security critical
location is at the center of the circle, and we need to monitor
the activities within a certain range. The area of the circle
is 1km
2, and the radius of the circle is about 565m. The ra-
dio range r of the sensors is 110m, and any two sensors that
have a distance shorter than r can directly communicate to
each other.
Two deployments of the sensors are examined: grid place-
ment and random placement. In the grid placement, the sen-
sors are deployed at an interval of 50m along the imaginary
vertical or horizontal lines. A total number of 401 sensors
are placed in the circle and the average degree of connec-
tivity is 11.0. In the random placement, we apply the dart
throwing method proposed in [18] to place the sensors ran-
domly and roughly uniformly in the area. To maintain a
similar degree of connectivity as in the grid placement, 441
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Figure 5. Wormhole indicators of the sensors in
different network scenarios.
The sensors are deployed on the X-Y plane as in Figure 1.(a).
The Z-axis shows the value of the wormhole indicator. The
error rate em is 0.4 in the experiments.
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Figure 6. Experimental network topology.
In both gures, only a part of the neighbor connections are shown
as the lines to assist the understanding of the gures.
sensors are used. Examples of the placements are shown in
Figure 6. In both placements, the controller is located at the
center of the circle. The justication of this sensor density
choice is discussed in section 5.
We model the distance estimation errors as uniform noises.
If the accurate distance between two sensors is d (d  r) and
the error rate is em, a random value drawn from the uniform
distribution [d  (1   em);d  (1 + em)] will be used as the
measured distance. If the selected value is smaller than 0
or larger than the radio range, 0 or r will be used respec-
tively. In the experiments, em changes from 0 to 0.8. For
a fake neighbor connection through a wormhole, a random
value from 0 to the radio range will be rst selected as d,
and then the error will be added. The data points in the
gures represent the averages over 15 trials using dierent
error values.
4.1 Grid Placement
The grid placement of sensors is shown in Figure 6.(a).
Seven sensors in the circle and seven sensors on the border of
the area are selected as the potential victims of wormholes.
They are labeled as I1 to I7 and E1 to E7 respectively.
Two groups of experiments are conducted. The rst group
examine the MDS-VOW algorithm under dierent em rates.
Four scenarios are considered: (1) no wormhole exists, (2)
a wormhole links I1 and I7, (3) a wormhole links E1 and
E7, and (4) a wormhole links I1 and E7. The detection
accuracy of MDS-VOW and its impacts on routing are of
special interest.
Figure 7 and 8 show the results. In Figure 7.(a), we nd
that MDS-VOW can detect the fake connections under most
conditions when em increases from 0 to 0.8. MDS-VOW
has a low false negative ratio. From Figure 7.(b) we nd
that when em is smaller than or equal to 0.6, less than 1%
of the real neighbor connections will be wrongly labeled as
wormholes. When em increases to 0.8, the false positive
alarm ratio becomes larger, but still less than 5% of the real
connections are wrongly accused.
The false positive alarms will lead to the breaks of the real
neighbor connections and the increase in the average path
length. If all connections of a sensor are broken, an isolated
node will be generated and the events detected by such sen-
sor cannot be transferred out. To examine the impacts of
the false positive alarms, we show in Figure 8 the increase
in the average path length between all sensor pairs. Since
the degree of connectivity in the original layout is relatively
large, the increase in the average path length is small. We
do not detect isolated sensors in the experiments.
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Figure 7. Detection accuracy of MDS-VOW in grid
placement when varying em.
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In the second group of experiments, we x the choice of
em at 0.4 and examine the detection accuracy of MDS-VOW
when the distance between the two ends of the wormhole
changes. Seven sensors in the circle and seven on the border
are selected as the potential victims. Since the increase in
the average path length is small in Figure 8, we focus on the
false alarm ratio in this group of experiments.
The ends of the wormhole are put at dierent positions
in the network and three conditions of the fake connection
are examined: (1) one end of the fake connection is I1, the
other end changes from I2 to I7, (2) one end is I1, the
other end changes from E2 to E7, and (3) one end is E1,
the other end changes from E2 to E7. The results are shown
in Figure 9 and under most conditions the fake connections
can be eectively located and not many false positive alarms
are introduced into the network.
4.2 Random Placement
In the random placement scenarios, we apply the dart
throwing method to place the sensors randomly and roughly
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Figure 9. Detection accuracy of MDS-VOW when
varying wormhole length.
uniformly in the network. One layout is shown in Figure
6.(b). Only a part of the neighbor connections are shown
in the gure to assist the understanding of the topology.
Two groups of experiments are conducted to examine the
detection accuracy of MDS-VOW. In group one, two ran-
dom positions in the area are selected as the ends of the
wormhole. The wormhole then chooses a sensor from each
end that has the shortest distance to it. If the distance be-
tween the two sensors is larger than r, a fake connection
between them will be established. Otherwise, the position
of the wormhole will be generated again. Experiments are
conducted by varying the error rate em.
In the second group of experiments, there is still only one
wormhole in the network. But the wormhole will establish
fake connections between all sensor pairs when the sensors
are within the radio range to the ends of the wormhole. For
example, if s1 to s3 are the sensors within r to one end of
the wormhole, and s4 to s6 are within r to the other end of
the wormhole, 9 fake connections will be established if the
distance between every pair is larger than r. Experiments
are conducted by varying em and the results are illustrated
in Figure 10.
Studying the results shown in Figure 7 to Figure 10, we
nd that when em  0:6, MDS-VOW has a low false positive
ratio and a low false negative ratio. The proposed mecha-
nism can detect the fake connections in the grid placement
and random placement scenarios without hurting many real
connections.
5. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The proposed mechanism detects wormholes by visual-
izing the anomalies caused by such attacks in the recon-
structed network. It avoids the requirements of special hard-
ware and can be applied to the environments such as sensor
networks. The MDS-VOW mechanism consists of multiple
m
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Figure 10. Detection accuracy of MDS-VOW in random
placement.
steps and each step uses the result from the previous one as
input. The details of the method for each step are transpar-
ent to other steps and they can be improved independently.
For example, when a new feature-preserving surface smooth-
ing mechanism appears, it can replace the current one in the
algorithm and helps to reduce the false positive alarm ratio.
Impacts of Sensor Density
The sensor density impacts the MDS-VOW algorithm in
two ways: (1) The calculation of the distance matrix, and
(2) The performance degradation caused by false positive
alarms. Assuming a network with innite sensor density.
When two sensors h1 and h2 have a distance d, where r <
d < 2r, we can always nd a third sensor h3 that is on the
line determined by h1 and h2 and has a distance shorter than
r to both of them. Therefore, when using the Dijkstra's
method, we can add jh1h3j and jh2h3j to calculate jh1h2j
without introducing any error. As the density decreases, er-
rors will be introduced into the distance matrix even when
the distance estimations between neighbor sensors are accu-
rate. For the same reason, when sensor density decreases,
the degree of connectivity becomes smaller, and the node
has a higher probability to become an isolated sensor when
the false positive alarms break the real connections.
We refer to previous research eorts and experiments in
real applications when choosing the sensor density in our
experiments. Similar density has been adopted in [26]. In
that paper the authors deploy 200 nodes in a 10l 10l area
when the radio range changes from l to 2l. In the vehicle
classication experiments conducted by U.S. Army [8], the
sensors are deployed at an interval of 30   40m. In our
experiments, we set the grid size as 50m.
Security of MDS-VOW
As a security enhancement to defend against wormhole at-
tacks, the robustness of MDS-VOW must be studied. Dur-
58ing the execution of MDS-VOW, data trac exists between
the controller and the sensors and among the sensors. The
malicious nodes can attack these packets by: (1) changing
the contents or impersonating the senders of the packets
when re-transmitting them, (2) dropping these packets, and
(3) changing the re-transmission power to mislead the dis-
tance estimation. We now discuss the solutions to these
attacks respectively.
For the rst attack, the integrity of the packets can be pro-
tected by the group key shared by the sensors and the con-
troller by attaching the message authentication code (MAC)
to the packets. For the second attack, the analysis for sys-
tem bootstrap shows that the malicious nodes cannot drop
these packets to hide the fake connections because a neigh-
bor connection must be examined by the controller before
it is adopted by the sensors. The malicious nodes can still
adjust the re-transmission power of the packets to mislead
the distance estimation for the fake connections. But since
the radio range is known to the sensors, its impacts are
restricted and it can be viewed as a special distance mea-
surement error.
Modeling Measurement Errors
The errors of the distance estimation using the received
signal strength are dicult to model considering the features
that may impact the measurement accuracy. Introducing
the anchor nodes that know their positions into the system
can reduce the positioning errors in an attack-free environ-
ment [15]. Besides the uniform noise model that is adopted
in this paper, the Gaussian noise model of placement errors
has been applied in [26]. We are now conducting more ex-
periments of MDS-VOW that use the Gaussian noise model.
As we discuss in the previous part, when a more accurate
model of the errors appears, the current one can be replaced
with limited eorts.
Extending MDS-VOW to Movable Environments
In this paper, we assume that the sensors are not self-
movable. Therefore, unless some out-force moves the nodes,
the positions and the neighbor relations of the sensors will
not change. This assumption allows the controller to run
MDS-VOW once during the network bootstrap and tell ev-
ery sensor its non-suspicious neighbors. When extending
MDS-VOW to a movable environment, we must overcome
two diculties: how to adapt to route changes, and how to
reduce the communication and computation overhead.
In a movable environment, new neighbor relations and
new routes may appear when the nodes change their posi-
tions. The wormhole detection mechanism must adapt to
such changes by re-computing the network topology. If a
proactive method is adopted, the controller needs to detect
wormholes periodically. If a dierential threshold coding
technique is adopted, a node will update its information
and activate a re-detection of wormholes only when its mea-
surements change beyond a threshold. In both cases, only
the initial ideas are available and much more research work
is required to turn them into reality.
Future Work
There are several immediate extensions to the proposed
mechanism. To illustrate the ideas of MDS-VOW, we as-
sume a at plane on which the sensors are deployed in the
experiments. In the real environments, more complex condi-
tions need to be considered. First, the terrain of the network
can be non-at and false alarms may be introduced by this
(a) front (b) left side
(c) top
Figure 11. Impacts of two wormholes on the
reconstructed network.
reason. Therefore, a more robust and error-tolerant detec-
tion method needs to be designed. Second, it is dicult to
deploy the sensors as a nice polygon in reality. More research
eorts are required to study the impacts of wormholes when
the shape of the network area is irregular.
The MDS-VOW mechanism is a centralized scheme. It
makes the mechanism less adaptable and leads to the secu-
rity problems such as single point of failure. There has been
research work to divide the network into sub-divisions and
to develop a distributed MDS method [26]. Then the pieces
of the reconstructed network will be merged and the VOW
method can be applied to detect wormholes.
Extended eorts are also required to study the shape of
the reconstructed surface when multiple wormholes exist in
the network. Figure 11 illustrates an example of the recon-
structed network when two wormholes link the sensor pairs
(A;C) and (B;D) as in Figure 1.(a). When multiple worm-
holes exist in the network, the reconstructed surface can be
distorted far from the original layout and the detection of
the two-ended torch structure alone may not be able to lo-
cate all fake connections. A more sophisticated mechanism
based on the statistical decision theory is required.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Dierent from the previous eorts that require the wire-
less nodes to be equipped with special hardware, the pro-
posed MDS-VOW mechanism focuses on the features that
are introduced by the wormholes. It can be deployed as a
hardware-ecient method to defend against wormhole at-
tacks in a sensor network. MDS-VOW uses the inaccurate
distance estimations between the neighbor sensors as the
inputs, and rebuilds a layout of the sensors using multi-
dimensional scaling. The analysis and experiments show
that the wormhole bends the reconstructed network to pull
the sensors to each other and t the fake connections. This
forms the two-ended torch structure that can be used to de-
tect the fake neighbor connections. MDS-VOW consists of
multiple steps and each step can be improved independently.
Experiments using grid placement and random placement
of sensors are conducted to examine the detection accuracy
of the proposed mechanism. The results show that when
the distance estimation errors are uniformly distributed and
the error rate is equal to or smaller than 0.6, MDS-VOW
can detect most of the fake connections without introducing
many false positive alarms. Since the sensors in the exam-
ined scenarios are dense and the degree of connectivity is
59relatively large, breaking the wrongly accused neighbor con-
nections will not impact the connectivity and routing of the
network to a large extent.
Additional research is required to study the performance
of MDS-VOW under more complex scenarios. The problems
that are of special interest include: how to detect worm-
holes in an irregular-shaped network on a non-at terrain,
and the impacts of multiple wormholes on the reconstructed
network. The results will lead to a more accurate and e-
cient solution that can defend against wormholes for sensor
networks.
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